

# Participatory Election Oversight Socialization and Public Participation: An Implementation Analysis of Electoral Supervision in North Sulawesi

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## ABSTRACT

This article analyzes the implementation of a participatory election oversight socialization program and its implications for public participation in election supervision in North Sulawesi. The study is positioned within public administration and policy implementation because participatory oversight is not merely a communication activity; it is an institutional intervention designed to transform citizens from passive voters into active democratic supervisors. A qualitative descriptive-analytical approach was used. Data were generated through interviews with strategic implementers, technical staff, participatory oversight cadres, and community participants, supported by observation and document analysis. The analysis applies Edward III's implementation framework, namely communication, resources, disposition, and bureaucratic structure, and connects these dimensions with supporting and inhibiting factors affecting citizen participation. The findings show that the program has been implemented through vulnerability-based regional mapping, targeted participant selection, face-to-face and online dissemination, case simulation, discussion, pre-test and post-test activities, and follow-up communication through WhatsApp groups and contact persons. Communication, disposition, and bureaucratic structure generally support implementation, but resources remain the weakest dimension because of budget limitations, archipelagic geography, uneven internet access, limited activity duration, and the insufficient readiness of citizens to prepare initial evidence for reports. The program improves electoral knowledge, awareness, consultation behavior, and initial courage to report violations, but public participation has not fully developed into strong, timely, and complete formal reporting. The article proposes an integrated model of sustainable participatory oversight based on risk-based planning, localized case simulation, cadre networks, accessible reporting channels, and continuous feedback. The study contributes to policy implementation literature by showing that citizen participation in electoral supervision requires institutional education, social trust, reporting protection, and resource-sensitive program design.

**Keywords:** Bawaslu, election supervision, participatory oversight, policy implementation, public administration, public participation, socialization program.

## INTRODUCTION

General elections are a constitutional mechanism for realizing popular sovereignty and producing legitimate government. The quality of elections is not determined only by voting procedures or the technical readiness of electoral management bodies; it is also determined by the effectiveness of supervision. In democratic administration, supervision ensures that electoral competition is carried out according to principles of direct, general, free, secret, honest, and fair elections. When citizens believe that violations are prevented and handled, public trust in election results becomes stronger. For this reason, election supervision is not merely a bureaucratic obligation but a public value instrument that protects democratic legitimacy (Republic of Indonesia, 1945; Republic of Indonesia, 2017).

The Election Supervisory Agency has a statutory mandate to prevent and act on election violations and to increase public participation in election supervision. This mandate places the institution in a dual role. On the one hand, it operates as a formal supervisory body with authority to monitor stages, receive reports, investigate alleged violations, and coordinate with other election institutions. On the other hand, it must function as a civic educator that builds public knowledge, awareness, and courage to participate in preventing violations in the surrounding environment. This second role is crucial because formal supervisors are limited in number, while election events occur across villages, neighborhoods, campuses, workplaces, community organizations, and digital spaces.

The empirical background of this article is the increasing complexity of electoral violations. Money politics, misuse of state resources, campaign violations, intimidation, and misinformation have become increasingly difficult to monitor through conventional supervision alone. Digital financial technology has also changed the modus of money politics: distribution is no longer limited to cash but may involve bank transfers, electronic wallets, and other digital transactions. Such changes require citizens who are able to recognize violations and communicate early information to supervisors. Therefore, participatory oversight becomes a strategic extension of public supervision.

North Sulawesi provides an important context for the study. The province contains mainland, coastal, and archipelagic areas, with uneven access to transport, internet, and information channels. These characteristics influence the dissemination of election supervision messages and the accessibility of reporting services. Some communities are easier to reach through face-to-face meetings, while others require digital or community-based approaches. The geographical and social diversity of the province means that a single communication strategy cannot fully address all public participation challenges. See table 1.

**Table 1.** Community reports of alleged election violations in 2019 and 2024.

Year	Community reports of alleged violations	Interpretation
2019	586	Baseline level of public reporting
2024	1,023	Increased reporting potential and awareness

Initial institutional data show that community reports of alleged election violations increased from 586 in the 2019 election to 1,023 in the 2024 election. This increase indicates that citizens have

growing potential to engage in electoral supervision. However, an increase in reports does not automatically mean that public participation has become effective. Effective participation requires citizens to understand which acts constitute violations, how to collect preliminary evidence, where to report, how to protect personal safety, and what follow-up mechanism is available. Without this practical knowledge, citizens may recognize violations but remain reluctant to submit formal reports.

Participatory oversight socialization has therefore become a strategic instrument. Its purpose is not only to disseminate legal norms but also to develop public capacity through examples, local cases, simulations, discussions, and follow-up guidance. The program seeks to explain what citizens should do when they identify vote-buying, campaign violations, misuse of public facilities, or other irregularities. In this sense, socialization is a form of civic education and policy implementation at the same time. It translates regulatory mandates into learning activities that are expected to influence citizen behavior.

Previous studies on electoral participation have often discussed voter turnout, political behavior, or institutional supervision. Fewer studies analyze participatory oversight socialization as an implementation instrument at the provincial level. This article addresses that gap by examining how the program is implemented, which factors support or inhibit it, and how it shapes public participation in election supervision. The analysis uses Edward III's policy implementation framework because the program depends heavily on communication, resources, implementers' disposition, and bureaucratic structure (Edward III, 1980; Hill & Hupe, 2022).

The article argues that participatory oversight socialization should be understood as a managed public education process. It is successful when it not only informs citizens but also builds practical readiness, reporting confidence, and sustainable networks between citizens and formal supervisors. The central research questions are: how is the participatory oversight socialization program implemented through communication, resources, disposition, and bureaucratic structure; and how do supporting and inhibiting factors shape its implications for public participation in election supervision?

## THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

### Public Policy and Electoral Supervision

Public policy refers to decisions, rules, programs, and institutional actions designed to solve public problems and create public value. In contemporary public administration, policy is not only a formal regulation but also a set of programs and services that must be implemented in specific social contexts (Agustino, 2020; Nugroho, 2020). Electoral supervision is a public policy domain because it requires legal authority, institutional capacity, public communication, interagency coordination, and citizen involvement.

In the field of election governance, supervision is designed to protect the integrity of the electoral process. It ensures that stages such as voter registration, nomination, campaigning, voting, counting, and recapitulation are carried out according to legal standards. However, the increasing complexity of violations means that formal supervision must be complemented by public participation. Participatory oversight is therefore both a policy instrument and a democratic practice. It reflects the idea that citizens are not merely beneficiaries of policy but also co-producers of public integrity (Osborne, 2020).

### **Policy Implementation and Edward III Framework**

Implementation is the process of translating policy decisions into practical action through organizations, procedures, resources, and interactions with target groups. A policy that is formally well-designed may fail if its implementation is weakened by unclear communication, insufficient resources, poor implementer commitment, or fragmented bureaucracy (Hill & Hupe, 2022; Winarno, 2021). In participatory oversight, implementation is visible in how socialization materials are designed, how target groups are selected, how field activities are conducted, and how citizens are supported after the activity ends.

Edward III's implementation framework identifies four key variables: communication, resources, disposition, and bureaucratic structure (Edward III, 1980). Communication concerns the clarity, consistency, and transmission of policy messages. Resources include staff, budget, facilities, materials, technology, and time. Disposition refers to implementers' commitment, responsiveness, integrity, and willingness to support target groups. Bureaucratic structure includes standard operating procedures, task division, reporting mechanisms, and coordination across levels. These dimensions are suitable for analyzing participatory oversight socialization because the program relies on educational messages, field facilitation, public trust, and reporting procedures.

### **Participatory Oversight and Public Participation**

Participatory oversight is an institutional effort to involve citizens in monitoring elections. It goes beyond passive attendance at socialization events. It includes recognizing violations, preventing irregularities in local environments, sharing early information, consulting with supervisors, and submitting reports when evidence is sufficient. The regulation on participatory oversight identifies several instruments, including participatory oversight education, citizen forums, oversight corners, cooperation with universities, participatory oversight villages, and digital participatory oversight communities (Bawaslu RI, 2023).

Public participation is strengthened when citizens have knowledge, motivation, channels, trust, and protection. Giugni and Grasso (2022) emphasize that political participation is shaped by resources, opportunities, networks, and perceived efficacy. Citizens may be willing to participate but remain inactive if they do not know the procedure, fear social consequences, or doubt that reports will be followed up. Thus, the problem of participation is not only a problem of awareness; it is also a problem of institutional accessibility and social confidence.

### **Socialization as Civic Education**

Socialization in electoral supervision can be understood as civic education. It seeks to develop knowledge of election law, awareness of democratic responsibility, and skills for identifying and reporting violations. The most effective socialization is not limited to one-way lecture delivery. It involves dialogue, local case examples, simulations, scenario-based learning, and follow-up mentoring. Such approaches correspond with adult learning principles, where participants learn better when the content is practical, contextual, and connected to real experiences (Creswell & Creswell, 2022).

In contexts where citizens encounter complex violations such as digital money politics, civic education must provide practical examples and reporting guidance. The shift from cash-based to digital transactions makes traditional monitoring less sufficient. Citizens need to understand how violations may occur, what preliminary evidence can be used, and which reporting channels are available. Socialization therefore becomes a bridge between legal knowledge and practical citizen action.

### **Digital Challenges and Community Networks**

Digitalization creates both challenges and opportunities for participatory oversight. It enables rapid dissemination of information through social media, WhatsApp groups, online communities, and digital reporting channels. At the same time, it creates new forms of violations and misinformation that require digital awareness. Persily and Tucker (2020) note that digital platforms can reshape democratic participation and electoral risks. Participatory oversight must therefore combine offline community education and online engagement.

Community networks are important because citizens usually consult people they trust before reporting sensitive violations. Cadres, alumni of participatory oversight education, community leaders, student groups, youth organizations, and local media can become bridges between formal supervisors and the public. However, networks need continued support. Without consolidation, mentoring, and functional reporting channels, cadres may remain passive after training.

### **METHOD**

This article uses a qualitative descriptive-analytical design. The approach was selected because the study aims to understand program implementation, institutional processes, field experiences, and the meaning of public participation rather than measuring statistical effects. Qualitative research is appropriate when the researcher seeks to explore how actors interpret a program, how implementation occurs in context, and how different groups experience policy interventions (Creswell & Poth, 2024; Hennink, Hutter, & Bailey, 2020).

The setting is the Election Supervisory Agency at the provincial level in North Sulawesi. The program under analysis is participatory oversight socialization, including activities that involve public education, case discussion, simulation, digital communication, follow-up mentoring, and community-based networks. The research focus is divided into two domains. The first domain concerns implementation, analyzed through communication, resources, disposition, and bureaucratic structure. The second domain concerns supporting and inhibiting factors and their implications for public participation.

Data sources consisted of strategic informants, technical implementers, participatory oversight cadres, and community participants. Strategic informants provided information on program planning, regional prioritization, institutional strategy, evaluation, and improvement direction. Technical informants explained field implementation, materials, reporting coordination, obstacles, and post-socialization support. Cadres shared experiences of training, informal education, community consultation, and challenges in maintaining activity after the program. Community participants described their understanding of participatory oversight, their reporting concerns, and the type of support needed after socialization.

Data were collected through in-depth interviews, observation of program activities, and document review. The interviews were semi-structured so that each informant could explain experiences in depth while still being connected to the research focus. Observations were used to understand how activities were carried out and how participants responded. Documents such as program records, report data, regulatory documents, and internal materials were used to strengthen and verify interview findings.

Data analysis followed the interactive qualitative process of data reduction, data display, conclusion drawing, and verification (Miles, Huberman, & Saldaña, 2020). The analysis categorized data according to the implementation dimensions and then interpreted the relationship between implementation performance, inhibiting factors, and participation outcomes. Credibility was

strengthened through triangulation of sources and techniques. Findings from leaders were compared with technical staff, cadres, and community participants, while interview data were checked against documents and observational notes. See table 2.


**Table 2.** Informants and primary data sources

Informant category	Role or position	Main information explored
Strategic implementers	Program leaders and division/section coordinators	Planning, strategy, priority areas, evaluation, and program improvement
Technical implementers	Subsection staff and violation-handling staff	Field implementation, materials, reporting flow, and implementation obstacles
Participatory cadres	Alumni or participants of participatory oversight education	Training experience, community education, cadre role, and sustainability needs
Community participants	Socialization participants and general public	Program understanding, reporting barriers, safety concerns, and support needs

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

### Program Implementation Through Edward III Dimensions

The findings show that participatory oversight socialization has been implemented in a planned manner. Program planning begins with mapping vulnerable areas, determining target groups, selecting communication methods, and preparing materials. Activities are delivered through face-to-face meetings, online sessions, social media, case discussions, simulations, pre-test and post-test activities, and follow-up communication. The strongest aspect of implementation is the institutional commitment to educate citizens, while the weakest aspect is the availability and distribution of resources. See figure 1.



**Figure 1.** Community reports of alleged election violations in 2019 and 2024.

In the communication dimension, the program has successfully conveyed basic messages about participatory oversight and the role of citizens in maintaining election integrity. Participants generally understand that election supervision is not only the task of formal supervisors. They also recognize that communities can prevent violations, provide initial information, and report alleged violations. However, more technical materials remain difficult for some participants. These include

money politics, campaign violations, violation handling mechanisms, preliminary evidence, and reporting deadlines. This indicates that communication is effective at the level of awareness but still needs improvement at the level of operational readiness.

In the resources dimension, internal staff are considered capable of acting as speakers and facilitators. Nevertheless, budget limitations affect participant quotas, frequency of activities, cadre coverage, transport support, and the ability to reach archipelagic or remote areas. Some areas require higher costs because of transportation, accommodation, internet, and electricity challenges. These limitations make the program unevenly distributed. Resource constraints also affect post-socialization assistance; although WhatsApp groups, contact persons, mentors, and cadre networks are used, follow-up remains limited and depends on individual initiative. See figure 2.

**North Sulawesi Election Vulnerability Profile (2020)**



The province was described as a high-vulnerability electoral context; therefore, participatory oversight socialization is strategically important.

**Figure 2.** Converted election vulnerability profile in English.

The disposition of implementers is generally supportive. Program implementers demonstrate commitment to receiving complaints, providing consultation, and following up reports. They also convey that informants' identities can be protected. However, public trust is not automatically secured. Some citizens still worry that their identity may be exposed or that reporting may create social consequences. Others hesitate because they fear being asked to provide evidence that they do not know how to collect. Thus, the disposition of implementers is positive, but it must be accompanied by stronger protection communication and evidence-assistance mechanisms.


The bureaucratic structure supports implementation through coordination between the provincial agency, district/city supervisors, subdistrict supervisors, and village-level supervisors. However, many citizens do not yet understand the reporting flow in practical steps. Standard operating procedures exist institutionally, but they are not always translated into simple public-facing guidance. Citizens need accessible village-level channels, local consultation posts, and evidence consultation services before submitting formal reports. Without practical simplification, bureaucratic structure may appear clear to implementers but remain confusing for the public. See table 3, and figure 3.

**Table 3.** Summary of implementation findings based on Edward III dimensions

<b>Implementation dimension</b>	<b>Main finding</b>	<b>Implication for participation</b>
Communication	Basic messages are understood, but technical reporting materials remain difficult for some participants.	Awareness increases, but formal reporting readiness remains limited.
Resources	Staff capacity is sufficient, but budget, logistics, internet, transport, and activity frequency are constrained.	Program reach is uneven, especially in archipelagic and remote areas.

Disposition	Implementers show commitment and willingness to guide citizens.	Trust improves, but fear of identity disclosure and evidence burden persists.
Bureaucratic structure	Coordination exists across supervisory levels, but public-facing SOP remains unclear.	Citizens need simplified reporting flow and local consultation channels.

**Implementation Pathway of Participatory Election Oversight Socialization**



The four implementation dimensions determine whether socialization becomes sustainable citizen oversight.

**Figure 3.** Implementation pathway

### Supporting Factors

Several factors support the implementation of participatory oversight socialization. The first is institutional commitment. The agency views citizens as strategic partners in election supervision, not merely as passive voters. This commitment gives normative and organizational legitimacy to the program. It also encourages implementers to design activities that reach students, community organizations, youth groups, village communities, and other electoral stakeholders.

The second supporting factor is the use of interactive methods. Face-to-face meetings, local case discussions, simulations, and games help participants understand abstract concepts more easily. Participants are more responsive when material is connected to concrete events in their neighborhoods, such as vote-buying, intimidation, campaign violations, or misuse of public facilities. However, informants also emphasized that simulations must be expanded because participants need more practice in identifying violations and preparing reports.

The third supporting factor is the existence of cadre networks and social capital. Alumni of participatory oversight education share information informally with residents and coordinate with mentors or supervisors when they encounter potential violations. WhatsApp groups and contact persons function as consultation channels after activities. These networks can extend the effect of socialization beyond the formal event. Nevertheless, the number of cadres is still limited, and some communities do not know who can be contacted locally for consultation.

The fourth supporting factor is collaboration with community organizations, student groups, media, local radio, television, civil society organizations, and other stakeholders. Collaboration widens the program's reach and increases message legitimacy. It also enables the program to adapt to different target groups. For example, first-time voters may require simple and interactive materials, while community leaders may need guidance on preventing violations in their social environment. See table 4.

**Table 4.** Supporting factors in participatory oversight socialization

Supporting factor	Evidence from implementation	Strategic meaning
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Institutional commitment	Citizens are viewed as partners in supervision.	Provides legitimacy for participatory oversight as a public program.
Interactive methods	Face-to-face meetings, simulations, cases, and discussion are used.	Helps citizens translate rules into practical action.
Cadre networks	Cadres educate residents and consult through WhatsApp groups or mentors.	Extends socialization beyond formal events.
Community collaboration	The program engages students, organizations, media, and stakeholders.	Expands reach and adapts messages to target groups.

### Inhibiting Factors

The main inhibiting factor is limited resources. Budget limitations reduce the number of participants, the frequency of activities, and the capacity to reach many regions. In an archipelagic province, transport and accommodation costs are substantial. Some areas are difficult to reach, and activity planning must consider distance, weather, and local schedules. These constraints mean that program coverage cannot yet fully match the geographical complexity of North Sulawesi.

Internet and electricity limitations also inhibit socialization. Digital methods and social media are useful in expanding reach, but they are less effective in areas with weak signals or unstable electricity. This problem is particularly relevant for communities in remote or archipelagic areas. When digital access is weak, online socialization becomes uneven, and citizens may not receive complete information about reporting mechanisms or supervision procedures.

Another inhibiting factor is the technical difficulty of reporting. Many citizens do not understand what constitutes adequate preliminary evidence. They may hear about money politics or campaign violations, but they do not know whether hearsay, screenshots, photos, witness statements, or transaction evidence are sufficient. This uncertainty discourages formal reporting. Citizens often fear that a weak report will be rejected or will expose them to social conflict.

Fear and safety concerns also influence participation. Some citizens are reluctant to report because election violations often involve local actors who are socially close to them. They worry about pressure, retaliation, or the disclosure of their identity. Although implementers state that confidentiality can be maintained, citizens still need clearer assurance, visible protection mechanisms, and reporting channels that are close and trusted.

Finally, short activity duration limits learning depth. Participants stated that socialization is useful but often too brief to build full practical readiness. They need more simulations, longer practice sessions, locally relevant cases, and repeated guidance. This finding shows that participatory oversight cannot be built through one-time information delivery. It requires continuous education, mentoring, and institutional follow-up. See table 5.

**Table 5.** Inhibiting factors affecting public participation

Inhibiting factor	Specific manifestation	Effect on participation
Budget and logistics	Limited participant quota, activity frequency, transport, and accommodation.	Uneven program coverage across districts and islands.
Geographical barriers	Archipelagic and remote areas are difficult to reach.	Socialization does not fully reach high-risk communities.
Internet and electricity	Some areas have weak signals or limited power supply.	Online and social-media-based approaches are constrained.

Reporting evidence	Citizens are unsure about preliminary evidence and deadlines.	Participation stops at awareness or informal consultation.
Safety concerns	Citizens fear identity disclosure or social consequences.	Formal reporting remains hesitant.

### Implications for Public Participation

The program has positive implications for electoral knowledge. Citizens who participate in socialization better understand the meaning of participatory oversight, the role of communities in preventing violations, and the importance of election integrity. This knowledge is a necessary foundation for participation. Participants also become more aware that supervision is not only a formal institutional function but a shared democratic responsibility.

The program also increases initial courage. Some participants become more willing to consult with supervisors or cadres when they encounter potential violations. Cadres provide informal education to residents and maintain communication with mentors or local supervisors. This indicates that socialization creates relational channels that can support participation. However, courage to consult is not always equal to courage to file formal reports.

The strongest implication is the growth of preliminary participation: asking questions, discussing potential violations, seeking advice, and providing early information. The weaker implication is formal reporting with complete evidence. Many citizens remain uncertain about how to move from suspicion to legally usable report. This gap between awareness and formal reporting is the central implementation problem. It shows that participatory oversight socialization must be accompanied by evidence assistance, confidential consultation, and simplified reporting tools.

The increase in reports between 2019 and 2024 suggests that public participation is developing. Yet, the quality of participation must be strengthened. A strong report requires clarity of event, time, place, actors, witnesses, and preliminary evidence. Citizens need to learn these elements through simulation and repeated practice. Without such learning, participation may remain symbolic or informal rather than becoming an effective mechanism of electoral accountability. See table 6.

**Table 6.** Implications of the program for public participation

Participation outcome	Observed change	Remaining gap
Electoral knowledge	Citizens understand the role of participatory oversight.	Technical understanding of violation handling is still uneven.
Awareness	Citizens become more aware that supervision is a shared responsibility.	Some communities remain apathetic.
Consultation behavior	Citizens and cadres use WhatsApp groups and contact persons.	Local consultation channels are not evenly known.
Reporting courage	Some citizens are more willing to provide early information.	Formal reports are still constrained by fear and lack of evidence.
Sustainable oversight	Cadre networks can continue education beyond events.	Cadres need consolidation, follow-up roles, and institutional support.

### **Communication: From Awareness to Reporting Skill**

The findings show that communication is relatively effective in introducing the basic idea of participatory oversight. Citizens understand that they can participate in supervision and prevention. However, the more difficult task is converting awareness into reporting skill. Edward III emphasizes that communication must be clear, consistent, and transmitted effectively (Edward III, 1980). In this program, communication is clear at the normative level but less complete at the practical reporting level.

The implication is that materials should be redesigned around local violation scenarios. Instead of presenting only legal definitions, facilitators should use step-by-step cases: what happened, what evidence is needed, how the citizen should document it, where the citizen should report it, and how identity is protected. Such scenario-based communication would make the program more action-oriented. The need for simulations expressed by participants confirms that public education must move from lecture-based socialization to problem-based civic learning.

### **Resources: The Weakest Implementation Dimension**

Resources are the most significant limitation. This is consistent with implementation theory: a policy or program may have clear goals, but without adequate resources it cannot reach all target groups or maintain continuity (Hill & Hupe, 2022). In North Sulawesi, resource limitations are intensified by geography. Archipelagic areas require more time, transport, accommodation, and coordination. Therefore, resource planning must be geographically sensitive.

The resource issue should not be interpreted only as a budget problem. It also includes human resource distribution, cadre availability, supporting materials, internet access, offline modules, and local consultation infrastructure. Program improvement requires a mixed strategy: increasing budget where possible, prioritizing high-vulnerability areas, using local partners, preparing offline materials for low-connectivity areas, and empowering trained cadres as local educators.

### **Disposition and Trust**

Implementers show positive disposition through commitment, responsiveness, and willingness to guide citizens. However, citizen participation depends not only on implementer attitude but also on public trust. Reporting violations is a socially sensitive action, especially in close-knit communities. Citizens need confidence that their identity will be protected and that reports will be handled fairly. Disposition therefore must be communicated publicly through protection guarantees and visible service standards.

Trust can be strengthened by creating confidential consultation channels before formal reporting. Citizens may first consult whether an event constitutes a violation and whether the evidence is sufficient. This pre-reporting mechanism could reduce fear and prevent citizens from feeling alone. Cadres and village-level channels can also function as trusted intermediaries if they are trained and supervised properly.

### **Bureaucratic Structure and Public-Facing SOP**

The bureaucratic structure appears adequate from the institutional perspective because coordination exists between provincial, district/city, subdistrict, and village levels. Yet, the public often experiences the structure as complex. This difference shows that bureaucracy must be translated into public-facing procedures. A formal SOP is not enough if citizens cannot understand it.

A simplified reporting guide should explain five elements: what can be reported, what evidence is useful, where to report, how confidentiality is protected, and what happens after

submission. The guide should be available in print, social media, village posts, and community meetings. Such simplification would help bridge the gap between bureaucratic structure and citizen action.

### **Supportive Networks and the Sustainability Problem**

Cadre networks are a promising feature of the program. Cadres can extend education to residents and maintain communication with supervisors. However, networks require sustained roles. If cadres are trained but not consolidated, their activity may decline. The findings suggest that cadres need advanced training, periodic meetings, recognition, and integration into supervision activities during election stages.

Community participation becomes sustainable when citizens have repeated opportunities to learn and act. This aligns with public service logic, which emphasizes co-creation of public value (Osborne, 2020). Participatory oversight should therefore be managed as a continuous civic ecosystem, not as a seasonal activity close to election stages. Universities, youth organizations, religious groups, local media, and civil society organizations can be integrated into this ecosystem.

### **Digital and Geographical Adaptation**


The program uses social media and online methods, but digital strategies are constrained by unequal internet access. This finding calls for differentiated communication. Urban participants may be reached through social media, webinars, and online discussion groups, while remote or archipelagic communities may require offline modules, radio, village meetings, and printed reporting guides. Digitalization should not replace direct outreach; it should complement it.

Digital challenges also relate to the changing form of violations. If money politics increasingly uses digital transactions, citizens and supervisors need digital literacy. Socialization should include explanations of how digital evidence is documented ethically and legally, what screenshots or transaction information may be relevant, and how citizens can avoid spreading accusations without verification. This is important for protecting both electoral integrity and individual rights.

### **Proposed Model for Sustainable Participatory Oversight**

Based on the findings, the article proposes a sustainable participatory oversight model composed of five components: risk-based planning, localized case simulation, cadre and community networks, accessible reporting channels, and feedback plus protection. Risk-based planning ensures that activities prioritize high-vulnerability areas and groups with limited access. Localized case simulation translates legal norms into practical action. Cadre networks expand outreach. Accessible reporting channels reduce the distance between citizens and supervisors. Feedback and protection maintain trust and encourage repeated participation.

The model emphasizes that socialization should not end when the meeting ends. Post-activity mentoring is essential. Participants should know whom to contact, how to ask questions, and how to receive guidance. The model also strengthens the link between education and reporting. Citizens are not expected to become legal experts, but they should have enough practical knowledge to identify suspicious events, preserve initial evidence, and seek official assistance. See figure 4, and table 7.



Feedback closes the loop: citizens receive guidance, reports are clarified, and fear of reporting is reduced.

**Figure 4.** Recommended model for sustainable participatory oversight

**Table 7.** Practical model for strengthening participatory oversight socialization

Model component	Practical action	Expected output
Risk-based planning	Prioritize vulnerable districts, islands, first-time voters, and communities with low access.	More targeted and equitable program coverage.
Localized case simulation	Use local scenarios on money politics, campaign violations, and reporting deadlines.	Improved practical readiness to act.
Cadre and community network	Maintain WhatsApp groups, alumni meetings, mentor support, and local educator roles.	Sustained citizen supervision beyond formal events.
Accessible reporting channels	Create village-level consultation points, hotline, and clear public-facing SOP.	Reduced confusion and distance to reporting services.
Feedback and protection	Provide report status feedback and explain confidentiality guarantees.	Higher trust and reduced fear of reporting.

### Extended Practical Implications for Policy and Program Management

The findings have important implications for the management of participatory oversight programs beyond the immediate case of North Sulawesi. First, the program should be managed as a public learning system. A public learning system is different from a ceremonial socialization activity because it requires learning objectives, participant mapping, materials that are adapted to the audience, delivery methods that enable practice, and evaluation that measures whether citizens are ready to act. The evidence shows that citizens may understand the general idea of participatory oversight but still hesitate when asked to prepare evidence or submit a formal report. Therefore, the management of the program must include a competency pathway: awareness, recognition of violations, documentation of evidence, consultation, reporting, and feedback.

Second, participatory oversight requires the integration of formal bureaucracy and informal community trust. Formal structures are necessary because reports must follow legal procedures. However, citizens often make decisions through informal networks: family, neighbors, religious figures, local leaders, student groups, and cadres. If the formal reporting structure is not connected to these trusted networks, citizens may choose silence even when they recognize a violation. Program managers should map local trust actors and involve them as communication bridges. This does not replace official reporting channels; it strengthens the social pathway that leads citizens toward official channels.

Third, the program should distinguish between information dissemination and behavior change. Information dissemination asks whether participants have received messages. Behavior change asks whether participants are able and willing to use the messages in real situations. The

results indicate that socialization has improved information and awareness, but behavioral conversion into formal reporting remains incomplete. This means that evaluation indicators should not stop at attendance numbers, pre-test scores, or the quantity of materials distributed. Evaluation should also measure the number of consultations after training, the number of cadres who remain active, the accessibility of local reporting channels, the percentage of citizens who know evidence requirements, and the perceived safety of reporting.

Fourth, the resource strategy should use a differentiated service model. Areas with stable internet access can be served through online meetings, digital modules, and social media reinforcement. Areas with poor connectivity require printed materials, community radio, village forums, local facilitators, and repeated face-to-face sessions. Archipelagic areas require a different cost structure and should not be evaluated with the same logistical assumptions as urban areas. This differentiated approach is important because equal treatment does not always produce equitable access. Program equity should be measured by the ability of citizens in remote areas to access the same quality of guidance as citizens in urban centers.

Fifth, the program should establish a practical reporting support system. Many citizens fear that their reports will be considered weak because they do not know how to collect evidence. A support system could include a reporting checklist, examples of acceptable initial evidence, a safe consultation hotline, village-level reporting assistants, and a short guide on how to document events without violating the law or endangering oneself. These tools would reduce uncertainty and encourage citizens to move from passive knowledge to active supervision. In addition, feedback mechanisms should tell citizens whether their information has been received, whether additional evidence is needed, and what follow-up steps may occur.

Sixth, cadre sustainability should be included as a core program outcome. Training citizens once is not enough. Cadres need advanced materials, regular refreshment sessions, supervised practice, and recognition of their role. They can become local educators who explain violations, encourage early prevention, and direct residents to the correct reporting channels. If cadres are not consolidated, they may lose motivation or remain unsure of their role. Program managers should therefore develop a cadre database, periodic communication calendar, and performance indicators that capture cadre activity during and outside election stages.

Seventh, socialization should address digital violations more explicitly. The emergence of digital money politics, online misinformation, and digital campaign violations requires new learning content. Citizens need to understand that electoral violations may occur through electronic wallets, transfer receipts, online campaign content, or coordinated digital narratives. At the same time, the program must teach caution so that citizens do not spread accusations without verification. Digital evidence guidance should explain how to preserve screenshots, links, timestamps, account identities, and transaction traces in ways that support the reporting process while respecting legal and ethical boundaries.

Finally, the broader contribution of the program is democratic resilience. Participatory oversight is not only about increasing the number of reports; it is about creating a public culture in which citizens feel responsible for protecting electoral fairness. When citizens know how to prevent violations, when they trust reporting channels, and when they receive support after socialization, they become co-guardians of democracy. This is the central policy lesson of the study: citizen participation is produced through sustained institutional education, accessible services, and trust-based governance.

## CONCLUSION

This article concludes that participatory oversight socialization plays an important role in strengthening public participation in election supervision. The program has been implemented through planned activities involving vulnerability-based mapping, target group selection, face-to-face and online methods, case discussions, simulations, and follow-up communication. Communication, disposition, and bureaucratic structure generally support program implementation, while resources remain the most critical limitation. The program increases electoral knowledge, awareness of shared responsibility, initial courage to consult, and willingness to provide early information. However, participation has not fully developed into strong and complete formal reporting because citizens still face barriers related to evidence preparation, reporting procedures, fear of identity disclosure, and limited local access to consultation channels. This gap shows that the main challenge is not merely informing citizens but preparing them to act safely and correctly. The findings support the argument that participatory oversight must be managed as continuous civic education. One-time socialization is insufficient. The program needs repeated simulations, local case modules, sustained cadre networks, accessible reporting channels, and feedback mechanisms. In geographically diverse areas such as North Sulawesi, the program must combine digital and offline strategies so that remote and archipelagic communities are not left behind. The proposed model of sustainable participatory oversight integrates risk-based planning, localized case simulation, cadre networks, accessible reporting channels, and feedback plus protection. This model can help transform citizen participation from awareness into effective supervision practices. For policy implementation, the study demonstrates that the success of participatory oversight depends on the alignment of clear communication, adequate resources, trusted implementers, and simplified bureaucratic mechanisms that citizens can actually use.

### *Recommendations*

First, participatory oversight socialization should be scheduled earlier and conducted repeatedly before the core election stages. Activities that are too close to voting day may increase awareness but leave insufficient time for practice and community consolidation.

Second, socialization materials should be redesigned into practical modules. Each module should include local violation scenarios, preliminary evidence examples, reporting deadlines, reporting flow, and protection information. These modules should be available in printed and digital formats.

Third, cadre networks should be institutionalized. Alumni of participatory oversight education need periodic consolidation, advanced training, mentoring, and clear roles during election stages. Cadres can become local bridges for consultation and early information.

Fourth, reporting services should be made more accessible through village-level consultation channels, mobile service points, and clear contact persons. Citizens should be able to ask whether their evidence is sufficient before submitting formal reports.

Fifth, resource planning should reflect geographical complexity. Archipelagic and remote areas require different budget standards, transport planning, offline communication tools, and local partnerships. Equity of access should become a key indicator in program evaluation.

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